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Abstract
This paper introduces a model to analyze individual externalities and the associated 
negotiation problem, which has been largely neglected in the game theoretic litera-
ture. Following an axiomatic perspective, we propose a solution, as a payof sharing 
scheme, called the balanced threat agreement, for such problems. It highlights an 
agent’s potential inluences on all agents by threatening to enter or quit. We further 
study the solution by investigating its consistency. We also ofer a discussion on the 
related stability issue.
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1 Introduction
Externalities arise whenever an (economic) agent undertakes an action that has an 
efect on another agent. It is called a negative externality when the efect turns to 
be a cost, or a positive externality when it is a beneit. An associated fundamental 
question in real life is how to resolve the externality-incurred conlicts among 
agents through negotiation.
By the source of externalities, generally, there may exist two types: coalitional 
externalities and individual externalities. The former has been well studied in 
the literature based on the model of partition function form games, proposed by 
Thrall and Lucas (1963). In partition function form games, a coalition may have 
diferent values when the coalition structures to which the coalition is included 
are diferent. That is, externalities come from the players’ behavior of forming or 
breaking up coalitions. Various solution concepts have been proposed and ana-
lyzed by, among others, Myerson (1977), Bolger (1989), Feldman (1994), Maskin 
(2003), Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, 2010, 2018), Pham Do and Norde (2007), Ju 
(2007) and Borm et al. (2015).
Although individual externalities have been an important subject in econom-
ics, particularly in the context of institutional economics and the study of prop-
erty rights (cf. Coase 1960), it has been largely overlooked by the game theoretic 
literature. Diferent from coalitional externalities, in many interactive environ-
ments, agents may not take any speciically competitive or collaborative actions 
against others. But just due to the fact that they may co-exist in a situation, each 
agent may afect other agents in the given situation. The impact generated from 
one agent to another agent may be caused by a particular action, or simply by the 
fact of existence of the agent, as a pub owner might like a fashion store to be its 
neighbor but not prefer a ire station.
The classic common-pool resource problem in economics well illustrates this 
(cf. Ostrom et al. 1994; Funaki and Yamato 1999). Consider a number of isher-
men living around a lake and all have the right of ishing in it. Given the intrin-
sic diferences among those agents in capabilities, skills, tools and equipments, 
etc., their activities would generate diferent impact on each other and result in 
diferent utilities. Groundwater exploitation by the farms in a certain area is of 
the same nature. According to Ostrom (1990, 2003), common-pool resources are 
often well governed by common property protocols, rather than through private 
property or state administration, which is a mechanism based on self-management 
by a local community in coordinating the users of the resources. This empirical 
inding suggests that through negotiation among the participating agents, but not 
by privatization of the resources, externality-based conlicts could be resolved. 
Indeed, this general negotiation problem is what we are interested to explore in 
the paper from a game theoretic perspective, though we would focus on a speciic 
setting where individual agents may choose to enter or quit a certain situation, by 
which there appear individual externalities.
Ju and Borm (2008) introduced the model of primeval games to investigate 
individual externalities. Such an externality can happen because one agent might 
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have diferent values or utilities when the statuses of the surrounding agents are 
diferent. The framework of partition function form games does not model indi-
vidual externalities as it assumes that all the players in the player set N are always 
present even if they do not form a coalition. The model of primeval games is 
diferent from the classical cooperative games in two main aspects: Primeval 
games do not consider cooperation (and, hence, the notion of coalition does not 
really apply), and primeval games take into account all situations in which only 
a subgroup of players (of the player set N) are present. In this way, all possi-
ble externalities among players are modeled. Following a normative approach, 
Ju and Borm (2008) proposes a sequential negotiation process with which three 
compensation rules for primeval games are introduced. These compensation rules 
relect the most prominent, yet diferent fundamental principles in the context, 
and hence, can serve as speciic benchmarks to solve the associated compensation 
issue.
A restriction in the analysis of individual externalities in Ju and Borm (2008) 
is that the situation where all players appear is the only one in question but all the 
other situations only serve as reference points for the associated bargaining problem. 
In the current paper, we relax such a restriction and allow for analyzing the issue of 
bargaining and possible transfers with respect to an arbitrary group of agents. To 
this end, we extend the original notion of primeval games in Ju and Borm (2008) by 
accommodating the option for agents to have freedom to join in or leave the situa-
tion, and construct a model called individual externality negotiation problem.
In this paper, we are mostly interested in given a group of agents which payof 
scheme(s) can be agreed upon by all agents, provided that an agents can choose 
to enter or quit at his or her own will. We irst introduce the notion of threatening 
power in this environment. An agent’s threatening power is her potential net inlu-
ences on all agents’ payofs by executing either the option of entering the group or 
the option of quitting it. Following a unilateral perspective, we argue that an agree-
ment can be reached when all agents have equal threatening power. This idea axi-
omatically motivates a new solution concept, called the balanced threat agreement. 
For any group of agents in an individual externality negotiation problem, we show 
that the balanced threat agreement exists and is unique. We provide a second charac-
terization by means of local consistency.
The paper also addresses the stability issue of the balanced threat agreement. 
Since for any n-agents individual externality negotiation problem, there exists a bal-
anced threat agreements for any given group of agents, it is interesting to analyze 
under which group its balanced threat agreement would make all agents have no 
incentive to change the situation. As a irst attempt, we discuss the necessary and 
suicient condition for the balanced threat agreement of the group N to be stable.
It is important to highlight that throughout the paper the notion of cooperation 
is not considered. As seen in the formal deinitions below, when we introduce the 
notion of a group of agents, it is a neutral concept and does not imply cooperation 
among any agents of it at all. Neither the model nor the analysis considers coopera-
tion in a coalition or between coalitions.
The paper has the following structure. The next section presents the gen-
eral model: individual externality negotiation problem. Section  3 introduces two 
 Homo Oeconomicus
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straightforward axioms, eiciency and balanced threat, which axiomatically yields 
the solution concept of balanced threat agreement for this class of problems. Based 
on the local consistency, a second characterization is provided in Sect. 4. The inal 
section concludes the paper by ofering a discussion on the stability issue.
2  Individual Externality Negotiation Problems
Let N = {1,… , n} be the inite set of agents (or individuals). Note that for conven-
tional convenience, we may also call these agents players, although strictly speaking 
the notion of a player here in the current model is diferent from a player in a clas-
sical transferable utility game. Here, agents are not concerned with the option of 
forming coalitions or not, as it is not the question in the context. A subset S of N, in 
order to be distinguished from the usual concept of coalition in cooperative games, 
is called a group of individuals (in short, a group S). Here, the term of group is a 
neutral concept, which has nothing to do with cooperation or anything else, but sim-
ply means a set of individual agents in N.
A pair (i, S) that consists of an agent i and a group S of N to which i belongs is 
called an embedded agent (or insider) in S. Similarly, a pair (j, S) that consists of a 
player j and a group S of N to which j does not belong is called an unembedded agent 
(or outsider) with respect to S. Let E(N) denote the set of embedded agents, i.e.
Similarly, U(N) denotes the set of unembedded agents, i.e.
Deinition 2.1 A mapping u, deined by
that assigns a real number u(i,  S) to each embedded agent (i, S) ∈ E(N) and 
u(j, S) = 0 for all unembedded agents (j, S) ∈ U(N) is an individual-group function. 
A tuple (N, u, M) where M ∈ 2N�{�} is called an individual externality negotiation 
problem with respect to group M. The set of individual externality negotiation prob-
lems with agent set N is denoted by IEN.
The value u(i, S) represents the payof, or utility, of agent i, given that all agents in 
S are present (or active) while all agents in N∖S are absent (or inactive). Thus, with 
diferent set of active agents, agent i may receive diferent payofs, which suggests 
the externalities among agents. In case i is an unembedded agent, it means that agent 
i is not present, and by deinition, all such agents have zero payof. This is plausible 
E(N) =
{
(i, S) ∈ N × 2N|i ∈ S}.
U(N) =
{
(j, S) ∈ N × 2N|j ∉ S}.
u|E(N) ∶ E(N)⟶ ℝ and u|U(N) ∶ U(N)⟶ {0},
1 3
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because if an agent does not appear in a certain situation, this agent receives neither 
beneit nor cost from the situation.1 Moreover, we would like to emphasize that the 
agents in S individually come into view, without any cooperation among them. For 
any group of agents S ⊆ N and an individual-group function u, let uS denote the vec-
tor (u(i, S))
i∈N.
Here, speciically, we use M to denote the group of agents that are assumed to be 
active. That is, for an individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, M) ∈ IEN , 
the question we ask is which payof sharing scheme can be agreed upon by all agents 
of N so that M is to be accepted as the group of individuals to be present while 
agents of N∖M remain outside, when all agents of N are allowed to take actions of 
either staying in or quitting M (if she was an insider of M) and either staying outside 
or joining M (if she was an outsider with respect to M).
Deinition 2.2 A solution, or an agreement, for IEN is a function f, which associ-
ates with each individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, M) in IEN a vector 
f(N, u, M) of individual payofs in ℝN , i.e.,
The following three-agent example2 helps illustrate the class of individual exter-
nality negotiation problems.
Example 2.3 A three-agent individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, M) with 
N = {a, b, c} , M = {a, b} and the individual-group function u is given as follows. 
The underlying story could be well motivated by any common-pool resource situ-
ation, as explained in the introduction. Dependent which of the three agents would 
become active, i.e., as users of the resource (e.g., ishing in a pool, groundwater or 
underwater exploitation, coal mining, etc.), the agents may receive payofs as speci-
ied above by uS . Here, the very problem, as an example, is which payof scheme can 
be agreed on by all the three agents so that they can accept that both agents a and b 
are active whereas c is absent.
S ∅ {a} {b} {c} {퐚,퐛} {a, c} {b, c} {a, b, c}
u
S (0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 2) (−1, 5, 0) (−1, 0, 2) (0,−2, 4) (−2, 2, 3)
f (N, u, M) = (fi(N, u, M))i∈N ∈ ℝ
N
.
1 It is equally plausible to consider a more general scenario where unembedded agents may obtain non-
zero payofs, which may relect their “outside options” or the utilities of taking a diferent action from 
that of embedded agents. We assume zero payofs for all unembedded agents as it helps the exposition of 
such a new model and its analysis, while it also has an advantage in certain contexts to clearly pin down 
a local analysis of the individual externalities conined to the given situation itself, without involving any 
possible impact from outside.
2 To avoid the likely inconvenience in distinguishing an agent from the payof, the agents are named as 
a, b, and c instead of 1, 2, 3 in the example.
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3  The Balanced Threat Agreement
Consider the individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, M) given in Example 
2.3. Let us start the analysis by discussing why simply allocating to the agents of N 
according to uM may not necessarily be a desirable solution. Given now M = {a, b} , 
will the payof vector (−1, 5, 0) to the three agents, respectively, be accepted? Obvi-
ously, a is unhappy with −1 because if she chooses to quit, the new active group 
of agents will be {b} and thus a will get 0 which is better than a negative payof. 
Meanwhile, her quitting will cause b to sufer from losing 4 (= 5 − 1) . Therefore, a 
would be able to demand more by threatening to quit. Agent b has no much support 
to demand 5 directly as in uM because, apparently, if she chooses to quit, the cor-
responding new active group of agents will be {a} and then she will lost 5 but cause 
a’s situation to improve from −1 to 1. Similarly, one can also check the behavior 
of the unembedded agent c as an outsider of the group M. In this case, c could ask 
more because by showing up he can get a higher payof of 3 and at the same time 
make both a and b worse of. Hence, there seems to be a reason for a and/or b to pay 
c in order to keep him out of M. Consequently, the sharing scheme of (−1, 5, 0) is 
inapplicable.
From the above example, one can see that, for an individual externality negotia-
tion problem, what matters for agents to demand more from a group is her potential 
inluences to all agents by threatening to deviate from that status-quo (i.e., the given 
group). Accordingly, the inal payofs should be determined by a bargaining among 
all agents using their potential inluences.
Now we formally explore this idea that will lead to a solution for individual exter-
nality negotiation problems.
Given a group M ∈ 2N�{�} and a corresponding payof vector uM . Any agent 
k ∈ N can make a demand xM
k
 with respect to uM , as no restriction is imposed on the 
freedom for agent k to stay with or leave M (if k is an insider of M) or remain being 
out of or choose to join M (if k is an outsider of M). We then have a demand vector 
x
M = (xM
k
)
k∈N . The question is how much an agent k should demand?
Firstly, a demand vector xM can be accommodated if 
∑
k∈N
x
M
k
≤
∑
i∈N
u
M
i
 . Thus, 
from an aggregate perspective, it is natural to introduce an axiom of eiciency 
towards a solution.
Axiom (Efficiency)
For any individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, M), the payof vector xM 
is eicient if 
∑
k∈N
x
M
k
=
∑
i∈N
u
M
i
.
Next we investigate how much an individual agent may demand from uM . From 
a bargaining point of view and in the context of the individual externalities, all that 
an agent can do is to threat the others by taking unilateral actions of either quitting 
M if i was an insider or joining M if she was an outsider, which will make impact 
on the rest of the agents due to the resulting externalities. Accordingly, an agent’s 
1 3
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(individual) threatening power with respect to a demand vector xM , denoted by 휃M
i
,3 
can be measured as follows.
Deinition 3.1 (Threatening power) Given an individual externality negotiation 
problem (N, u, M), for any player i ∈ N , the threatening power 휃M
i
 is the total net 
inluence that agent i can exert on all other agents by taking a unilateral action that 
deviates from the status-quo of M, i.e.,
To help better understand this deinition, we further explain it as follows. Con-
sider an embedded agent i ∈ M . Supposing that all others’ demands (xM
k
)
k∈N�{i} 
are known, i can make a demand xM
i
 by threatening that if the demand is not satis-
ied, she will quit M, which is the only possible action for her to take in this case. 
If she quits, M is violated so that M�{i} becomes a new group while each 
k ∈ M�{i} will get u
M�{i}
k
 , and i will get nothing since she now becomes an unem-
bedded agent of M�{i} . Hence, by taking the action of quitting, i can incur a dam-
age on all other agents: They will lose 
∑
k∈N�{i}
�
x
M
k
− u
M�{i}
k
�
 , where u
M�{i}
k
= 0 
for all k ∈ N�M . The cost for i to execute the action of quitting is xM
i
− 0.
Likewise, if i is an outsiders of M, she could demand xM
i
 from M by threatening 
that, if her demand is not satisied, she will join M to form a new group M ∪ {i} . 
If she joins, M is violated so that within the new group M ∪ {i} each k ∈ M will 
get u
M∪{i}
k
 , and i will get u
M∪{i}
i
 since she now becomes an insider of M ∪ {i} . 
Hence, by making the action of joining, i can generate externalities to all other 
agents: They will lose 
∑
k∈N�{i}
�
x
M
k
− u
M∪{i}
k
�
 , where u
M∪{i}
k
= 0 for all 
k ∈ N�{M ∪ {i}} . The cost for i to execute the action of joining is xM
i
− u
M∪{i}
i
.
Example 3.2 Based on the three-agent individual externality negotiation problem 
(N, u, M) of Example 2.3, we illustrate the threatening powers of agents a, b and c, 
respectively. Given the demand vector x{a,b} =
{
x
{a,b}
a
, x
{a,b}
b
, x
{a,b}
c
}
,
Since we assume that all agents are free to quit or join a group, each agent 
would try to negotiate for more by making use of her threatening power. It is then 
휃
M
i
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
k∈N�{i}
�
x
M
k
− u
M�{i}
k
�
− xM
i
if i ∈ M;
∑
k∈N�{i}
�
x
M
k
− u
M∪{i}
k
�
−
�
x
M
i
− u
M∪{i}
i
�
if i ∈ N�M.
휃
{a,b}
a
=(x
{a,b}
b
− 1) + (x{a,b}
c
− 0) − x{a,b}
a
;
휃
{a,b}
b
=(x{a,b}
a
− 1) + (x{a,b}
c
− 0) − x
{a,b}
b
;
휃
{a,b}
c
=(x{a,b}
a
− (−2)) + (x
{a,b}
b
− 2) − (x{a,b}
c
− 3).
3 Precisely, the notation should be 휃x
M
i
 as the threatening power is related to the demand vector xM . For 
notational simplicity, where no confusion may arise, we use 휃M
i
 instead of 휃x
M
i
.
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plausible to expect that an agreement can only be accepted by all agents if the 
underlying payof vector could make them have the same threatening power.
Axiom (Balanced Threat)
For any individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, M), the payof vector xM 
satisies balanced threat axiom if 휃M
i
= 휃
M
j
 for all i, j ∈ N.
It is interesting to see that there exists a unique solution that satisies both the ei-
ciency and the balanced threat axioms.
Theorem  3.3 For any individual externality negotiation problem (N,  u,  M), there 
exists a unique solution that satisies both the eiciency and the balanced threat axi-
oms, which we call the balanced threat agreement 훽M , and it is given by
where
Proof Let (N, u, M) be an individual externality negotiation problem. One can read-
ily check that the balanced threat agreement deined above satisies both the ei-
ciency and the balanced threat axioms. To show that there exists a unique solution 
satisfying the two axioms, consider a solution xM that satisies both the eiciency 
and the balanced threat axioms. Below we show that xM will necessarily be identical 
to 훽M.
By eiciency, we know that
and by the balanced threat axiom, we have
where K ∈ ℝ.
By using the irst equation 
∑
k∈N
x
M
k
=
∑
i∈M
u
M
i
 , the second equation becomes
and the third equation becomes
훽M
t
=
1
n
∑
k∈M
uM
k
−
1
2
pt +
1
2n
∑
k∈N
pk for t ∈ N,
pt =
∑
k∈M⧵{t}
u
M⧵{t}
k
if t ∈ M
pt =
∑
k∈M
u
M∪{t}
k
− u
M∪{t}
t if t ∈ N ⧵ M.
∑
k∈N
x
M
k
=
∑
i∈N
u
M
i
,
For i ∈ M,
∑
k∈M⧵{i}
(xM
k
− u
M⧵{i}
k
) +
∑
l∈N⧵M
xM
l
− xM
i
= K,
For j ∈ N ⧵ M,
∑
k∈M
(xM
k
− u
M∪{j}
k
) +
∑
l∈N⧵M⧵{j}
xM
l
− (xM
j
− u
M∪{j}
j
) = K,
∑
k∈M
u
M
k
−
∑
k∈M⧵{i}
u
M⧵{i}
k
− 2xM
i
= K,
1 3
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Summing up all the second equations and the third equations, we have
where n = |N| . This and the irst equation imply
This equation and the second equation imply
for i ∈ M . Similarly, the third equation implies
for j ∈ N ⧵ M . This is equivalent to the following expression:
Here
Obviously, xM = 훽M .   ◻
Example 3.4 For the three-agent individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, M) 
of Example 2.3, together with the condition of eiciency that requires 
∑
k∈M
uM
k
−
∑
k∈M
u
M∪{j}
k
+ u
M∪{j}
j
− 2xM
j
= K.
n
∑
k∈M
uM
k
−
∑
i∈M
∑
k∈M⧵{i}
u
M⧵{i}
k
− 2
∑
i∈M
xM
i
−
∑
j∈N⧵M
∑
k∈M
u
M∪{j}
k
+
∑
j∈N⧵M
u
M∪{j}
j
− 2
∑
j∈N⧵M
xM
j
= nK,
K =
n − 2
n
∑
k∈M
uM
k
−
1
n
(∑
i∈M
∑
k∈M⧵{i}
u
M⧵{i}
k
+
∑
j∈N⧵M
∑
k∈M
u
M∪{j}
k
−
∑
j∈N⧵M
u
M∪{j}
j
)
xM
i
=
1
n
∑
k∈M
uM
k
−
1
2
∑
k∈M⧵{i}
u
M⧵{i}
k
+
1
2n
(∑
i∈M
∑
k∈M⧵{i}
u
M⧵{i}
k
+
∑
j∈N⧵M
∑
k∈M
u
M∪{j}
k
−
∑
j∈N⧵M
u
M∪{j}
j
)
xM
j
=
1
n
∑
k∈M
uM
k
−
1
2
(∑
k∈M
u
M∪{j}
k
− u
M∪{j}
j
)
+
1
2n
(∑
i∈M
∑
k∈M⧵{i}
u
M⧵{i}
k
+
∑
j∈N⧵M
∑
k∈M
u
M∪{j}
k
−
∑
j∈N⧵M
u
M∪{j}
j
)
xM
t
=
1
n
∑
k∈M
uM
k
−
1
2
pt +
1
2n
∑
k∈N
pk.
pt =
∑
k∈M⧵{t}
u
M⧵{t}
k
if t ∈ M
pt =
∑
k∈M
u
M∪{t}
k
− u
M∪{t}
t if t ∈ N ⧵ M.
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x
{a,b}
a
+ x
{a,b}
b
+ x{a,b}
c
= −1 + 5 + 0 = 4 , one can readily compute that the balanced 
threat agreement 훽{a,b} =
{
2
3
,
2
3
, 2
2
3
}
.
It is useful to provide the balanced threat agreement 훽N under N for an individual 
externality negotiation problem (N, u, N). Without proof, we present the following 
result.
Corollary 3.5 For any individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, N), the bal-
anced threat agreement 훽N is given by
for all t ∈ N.
This formula can be understood intuitively. Firstly, an agent t receives the equal 
division of the total payof 
∑
k∈N
u
N
k
 under N. Then, it will be adjusted by the average 
of the diference between two forces. 
∑
k∈N⧵{t} u
N⧵{t}
k
 is the aggregate payof that all 
other agents can get if t deviates (i.e., leaves) from N. 
1
n
∑
k∈N
∑
l∈N⧵{k} u
N⧵{k}
l
 is the 
average aggregate payof of all other agents if k deviates from N, or alternatively, 
is the aggregate payof of all other agents if any agent may deviate from N with 
equal probability. We also remark that xN only depends on the sum of utility vectors ∑
k∈N
u
N
k
 and 
∑
l∈N⧵{k} u
N⧵{k}
l
 for k ∈ N.
4  Consistency
In this section we study the underlying consistency property of the balanced threat 
agreement. Given an individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, M). Now we 
consider a situation that an agent m in the set N leaves the problem forever. By leav-
ing forever it would require that agent m will leave her beneit (or cost) behind and 
give up any possibility to exert any inluence to other players of N but would expect 
to get some payof in return. We then compare the solutions between the original 
situation (i.e., before m leaves) and the new situation (after m leaves).
The leaving agent m might have been a member of M or not. Let xM be the solu-
tion of the original problem (N, u, M). Suppose that when m leaves, she gets a payof 
x
M
m
 according to the solution xM , but she has to give up all other possible payofs. 
This gives rise to the new situation as a reduced individual externality negotiation 
problem (N�{m}, û
x
, M̂).4
When m was in M, for the new problem û we have the following condition
훽N
t
=
1
n
∑
k∈N
u
N
k
−
1
2
( ∑
k∈N⧵{t}
u
N⧵{t}
k
−
1
n
∑
k∈N
∑
l∈N⧵{k}
u
N⧵{k}
l
)
,
4 For notational simplicity, when no confusion is caused, hereafter we will write û instead of û
x
 and write 
the new problem as (N�{m}, û, M̂) , though one should bear in mind that the û is derived from (N, u, M) 
with respect to the speciic solution xM for (N, u, M).
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as m has taken away xM
m
 after she leaves. For any agent i ∈ M ⧵ {m} , û is given by
This is because after m leaves and takes away xM
m
 , she also gives up any payof in 
(N, u, M). Thus, in case agent i deviates from M, everyone else of M should get the 
same beneit (or cost) from the leaving of m, and hence they evenly share the payof 
u
M�{i}
m  . By the same token, for j ∈ N ⧵ M , û is given by
and
When m is not in M, û is given by
while for i ∈ M,
and for j ∈ (N ⧵ M) ⧵ {m},
It seems interesting to explore the possible consistency of a solution in terms of 
the reduced problem. Accordingly, we introduce the following axiom that requires 
the coincidence of the solutions between the two problems. While for the original 
problem, the solution is denoted by xM , for the reduced problem, the notation of the 
solution would depend on the set of insiders. If the leaving agent m was in M, the 
solution is denoted by x̂M⧵{m} , and if m is not in M, then it is denoted by x̂M.
Axiom (Local Consistency)
For any individual externality negotiation problem (N,  u,  M) and the reduced 
problem (N�{m}, û, M̂) , a solution xM is locally consistent if for all k ∈ N�{m},
Theorem  4.1 For any individual externality negotiation problem, the balanced 
threat agreement 훽M under M satisies local consistency.
∑
i∈M⧵{m}
û
M⧵{m}
i
=
∑
i∈M
u
M
i
− xM
m
û
M⧵{i,m}
k
= u
M⧵{i}
k
+
u
M⧵{i}
m
|M| − 2
, for all k ∈ M ⧵ {i, m}.
û
M∪{j}⧵{m}
k
= u
M∪{j}
k
+
u
M∪{j}
m
|M| − 1
, for all k ∈ M ⧵ {m},
û
M∪{j}⧵{m}
j
= u
M∪{j}
j
.
∑
i∈M
û
M
i
=
∑
i∈M
u
M
i
− x
M
m
,
û
M⧵{i}
k
= u
M⧵{i}
k
for all k ∈ M ⧵ {i},
û
M∪{j}⧵{m}
k
= u
M∪{j}
k
for all k ∈ M ∪ {j}.
x
M
k
(N, u, M) = xM̂
k
(N�{m}, û, M̂).
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Proof First we will consider a case of m ∈ M . By the deinition of 훽M , for 
(N�{m}, û, M̂) , we have, for t ∈ N ⧵ {m},
where
Then, for t ∈ M ⧵ {m} , we have
For t ∈ N ⧵ M , we have
These imply that, for t ∈ N ⧵ {m},
This completes the proof for the case m ∈ M.
For the case of m ∈ N ⧵ M , we remark that,
�
M⧵{m}
t (N�{m}, û, M̂) =
1
n − 1
�
k∈M⧵{m}
û
M⧵{m}
k
−
1
2
p̂t +
1
2n
�
k∈N⧵{m}
p̂k
=
∑
k∈M u
M
k
− �M
m
n − 1
−
1
2
p̂t +
1
2n
�
k∈N⧵{m}
p̂k,
p̂t =
∑
k∈M⧵{m,t}
û
M⧵{m,t}
k
if t ∈ M ⧵ {m}
p̂t =
∑
k∈M⧵{m}
û
M⧵{m}∪{t}
k
− û
M⧵{m}∪{t}
t if t ∈ N ⧵ M.
p̂t =
∑
k∈M⧵{m,t}
(
u
M⧵{t}
k
+
u
M⧵{t}
m|M| − 2
)
=
∑
k∈M⧵{m,t}
u
M⧵{t}
k
+ uM⧵{t}
m
=
∑
k∈M⧵{t}
u
M⧵{t}
k
= pt.
p̂t =
∑
k∈M⧵{m}
(
u
M∪{t}
k
+
uM∪{t}
m|M| − 1
)
− u
M∪{t}
t
=
∑
k∈M⧵{m}
u
M∪{t}
k
+ uM∪{t}
m
− u
M∪{t}
t =
∑
k∈M
u
M∪{t}
k
− u
M∪{t}
t = pt.
�
M⧵{m}
t (N�{m}, û, M̂)
=
∑
k∈M u
M
k
− �M
m
n − 1
−
1
2
pt +
1
2n
�
k∈N⧵{m}
pk
=
∑
k∈M u
M
k
n − 1
−
1
n − 1
�
1
n
�
k∈M
uM
k
−
1
2
pm +
1
2n
�
k∈N
pk
�
−
1
2
pt +
1
2n
�
k∈N⧵{m}
pk.
=
1
n − 1
(1 −
1
n
)
�
k∈M
uM
k
+
1
2(n − 1)
pm −
1
2n(n − 1)
�
k∈N
pk −
1
2
pt +
1
2(n − 1)
�
k∈N⧵{m}
pk
=
1
n
�
k∈M
uM
k
−
1
2n(n − 1)
�
k∈N
pk −
1
2
pt +
1
2(n − 1)
�
k∈N
pk
=
1
n
�
k∈M
uM
k
+
1
2n(n − 1)
(1 −
1
n
)
�
k∈N
pk −
1
2
pt = �
M
t
.
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These imply that for any t ∈ N�{m}
This completes the proof for the case m ∈ N ⧵ M .   ◻
Next, consider an individual externality negotiation problem (N,  u,  M) where 
N = {i, j} . The following payof vectors xM are referred to as standard for two-agent 
individual externality negotiation problems.
If M = N = {i, j} , then
If M = {i}, N ⧵ S = {j} , then
The standardness comes from a view of solving the problem by simply sharing the 
“surplus” equally, which is in the same spirit of the standard solution for transferable 
utility games. To see it clearly, taking x
{i,j}
i
 for example, it can be written as
That is, given agent i’s individual payof could be either u
{i}
i
 or 0, dependent on who 
the active agent is, it seems reasonable to take the average as the reference. So is for 
p̂t =
∑
k∈M⧵{t}
û
M⧵{t}
k
=
∑
k∈M⧵{t}
u
M⧵{t}
k
for all t ∈ M, and
p̂t =
∑
k∈M
û
M∪{t}
k
− û
M∪{t}
t =
∑
k∈M
u
M∪{t}
k
− u
M∪{t}
t for all t ∈ N ⧵ M ⧵ {m}.
�M
t
(N�{m}, û, M̂)
=
1
n − 1
�
k∈M
ûM
k
−
1
2
p̂t +
1
2(n − 1)
�
k∈N⧵{m}
p̂k
=
∑
k∈M u
M
k
n − 1
−
�M
m
n − 1
−
1
2
pt +
1
2(n − 1)
�
k∈N⧵{m}
pk
=
∑
k∈M u
M
k
n − 1
−
1
n − 1
�
1
n
�
k∈M
uM
k
−
1
2
pm +
1
2n
�
k∈N
pk
�
−
1
2
pt +
1
2n
�
k∈N⧵{m}
pk
=
1
n − 1
(1 −
1
n
)
�
k∈M
uM
k
+
1
2(n − 1)
pm −
1
2n(n − 1)
�
k∈N
pk
−
1
2
pt +
1
2(n − 1)
�
k∈N⧵{m}
pk = �
M
t
.
x
{i,j}
i
=
u
{i,j}
i
+ u
{i,j}
j
2
+
u
{i}
i
− u
{j}
j
4
, x
{i,j}
j
=
u
{i,j}
i
+ u
{i,j}
j
2
+
u
{j}
j
− u
{i}
i
4
.
x
{i}
i
=
u
{i}
i
2
+
u
{i,j}
i
− u
{i,j}
j
4
, x
{i}
j
=
u
{i}
i
2
+
u
{i,j}
j
− u
{i,j}
i
4
.
x
{i,j}
i
=
u
{i}
i
+ 0
2
+
1
2
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
u
{i,j}
i
+ u
{i,j}
j
−
u
{i}
i
+ 0
2
−
u
{j}
j
+ 0
2
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
.
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agent j. Then, they share the surplus from u
{i,j}
i
+ u
{i,j}
j
 equally. Similarly, if M = {i} , 
we have
Given agents now bargain over u
{i}
i
 as M = {i} , we take the average of payofs in the 
other two scenarios as the reference and then share the surplus equally.
Axiom (Standardness for 2-agent problems)
For any 2-agent individual externality negotiation problem, a solution is standard 
if it yields the standard payof vectors for any 2-agent individual externality negotia-
tion problem.
Theorem  4.2 The balance threat agreement 훽M is the only solution that satisies 
local consistency and standardness for 2-agent problems.
Proof Since the previous theorem shows that the balanced threat agreement satisies 
local consistency, and it is easy to show that the solution satisies the standardness 
for 2-agent problems, it suices to show the uniqueness part.
For that purpose, we use an induction on the number of agents. It is apparent to 
see that for the case of 2-agents, any solution that is standard yields a unique payof 
vector. Take any N such that |N| ≥ 3 . Next for any M ⊆ N , take any two solutions 
xM , yM which satisfy the local consistency. Then we have, if m ∈ M,
and
and if m ∈ N ⧵ M,
and
The induction hypothesis induces that, if m ∈ M,
and if m ∈ N ⧵ M,
Consider the case of m ∈ M . We have, for any t ∈ N ⧵ {m},
x
{i}
i
=
u
{i,j}
i
+ 0
2
+
1
2
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
u
{i}
i
−
u
{i,j}
i
+ 0
2
−
u
{i,j}
j
+ 0
2
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
.
x
M
t
(N, u, M) = x
M⧵{m}
t
(N ⧵ {m}, û
x
, M ⧵ {m}), for all t ∈ N ⧵ {m},
yM
t
(N, u, M) = y
M⧵{m}
t (N ⧵ {m}, ûy, M ⧵ {m}), for all t ∈ N ⧵ {m};
x
M
t
(N, u, M) = xM
t
(N ⧵ {m}, û
x
, M), for all t ∈ N ⧵ {m}
yM
t
(N, u, M) = yM
t
(N ⧵ {m}, ûy, M) for all t ∈ N ⧵ {m}.
y
M⧵{m}
t (N ⧵ {m}, ûy, M ⧵ {m}) = x
M⧵{m}
t (N ⧵ {m}, ûx, M ⧵ {m}) for all t ∈ N ⧵ {m},
yM
t
(N ⧵ {m}, ûy, M) = x
M
t
(N ⧵ {m}, ûx, M) for all t ∈ N ⧵ {m}.
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By similar arguments, for the case of m ∈ N ⧵ M , for any t ∈ N ⧵ {m} , we have
These imply that for any m ∈ N and any t ∈ N ⧵ {m},
Hence it also holds that for t ∈ N and m ∈ N ⧵ {t},
These imply that for any m ∈ N,
xM
t
(N, u, M) − yM
t
(N, u, M)
= x
M⧵{m}
t (N ⧵ {m}, ûx, M ⧵ {m}) − y
M⧵{m}
t (N ⧵ {m}, ûy, M ⧵ {m})
=
(
1
n − 1
∑
k∈M⧵{m}
û
M⧵{m}
x,k
−
1
2
p̂t +
1
2(n − 1)
∑
k∈N⧵{m}
p̂k
)
−
(
1
n − 1
∑
k∈M⧵{m}
û
M⧵{m}
y,k
−
1
2
p̂t +
1
2(n − 1)
∑
k∈N⧵{m}
p̂k
)
=
1
n − 1
∑
k∈M
ûM
x,k
−
1
n − 1
∑
k∈M
ûM
y,k
=
1
n − 1
(∑
k∈M
uM
k
− xM
m
)
−
1
n − 1
(∑
k∈M
uM
k
− yM
m
)
=
1
n − 1
(yM
m
− xM
m
).
xM
t
(N, u, M) − yM
t
(N, u, M)
= xM
t
(N ⧵ {m}, ûx, M) − y
M
t
(N ⧵ {m}, ûy, M)
=
(
1
n − 1
∑
k∈M
ûM
x,k
−
1
2
p̂t +
1
2(n − 1)
∑
k∈N⧵{m}
p̂k
)
−
(
1
n − 1
∑
k∈M
ûM
y,k
−
1
2
p̂t +
1
2(n − 1)
∑
k∈N⧵{m}
p̂k
)
=
1
n − 1
∑
k∈M
ûM
x,k
−
1
n − 1
∑
k∈M
ûM
y,k
=
1
n − 1
(∑
k∈M
uM
k
− xM
m
)
−
1
n − 1
(∑
k∈M
uM
k
− yM
m
)
=
1
n − 1
(yM
m
− xM
m
).
xM
t
− yM
t
=
−1
n − 1
(xM
m
− yM
m
).
xM
m
− yM
m
=
−1
n − 1
(xM
t
− yM
t
).
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Since |N| ≥ 3 , this implies that xM
m
= yM
m
 for all m ∈ N .   ◻
5  A Discussion on Stability
The main motivation of the paper is to propose a model to study a long neglected, 
yet general problem of individual externalities. Following a unilateral perspective, 
the balanced threat agreement, as a solution that provides a sensible payof vector 
for any given group of agents, is axiomatically established. It is further characterized 
by means of consistency.
Since the solution we proposed focuses on a given group structure, one may argue 
that some agents might have incentive to deviate, if that would result in a new group 
structure and make them better of. This issue becomes more relevant if we consider 
the general n-agent environment, as for any M ∈ 2N�{�} there exists a balanced 
threat agreement. Thus, it makes sense to analyze under which group its balanced 
threat agreement would make all agents have no incentive to change the situation. 
As a irst attempt and also for the fact that very often N is the focal point, we discuss 
the necessary and suicient condition for the balanced threat agreement of the group 
N to be stable.
As we know, for any individual externality negotiation problem (N,  u,  M), if 
i ∈ M leaves M, then she will get 0, and if j ∈ N ⧵ M joins M, then he will get u
M∪{j}
j
 . 
Accordingly, we can introduce the notion of stability as follows.
Deinition 5.1 (Stability) For an individual externality negotiation problem 
(N, u, M), a payof vector x ∈ ℝN is called stable if it satisies:
The following theorem can be readily constructed by the deinitions of eiciency 
and stability.
Theorem 5.2 For an individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, M), the stable 
payof vector x ∈ ℝN which satisies eiciency under M exists if and only if
It is straightforward to see that, when M = N , any payof vector x ∈ ℝN that satis-
ies x
k
> 0 for all k ∈ N is always stable.
The following theorem ofers a necessary and suicient condition for the bal-
anced threat agreement 훽 to be stable.
xM
m
− yM
m
=
(
−1
n − 1
)2
(xM
m
− yM
m
).
xi ≥ 0 for i ∈ M, xj ≥ u
M∪{j}
j
for j ∈ N ⧵ M.
∑
i∈M
uM
i
≥
∑
j∈N⧵M
u
M∪{j}
j
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Theorem 5.3 For an individual externality negotiation problem (N, u, N), the bal-
anced threat agreement 훽N is stable if and only if
Proof A necessary and suicient condition of the stability of xN is given by
This is equivalent to
Since 
∑
l∈N⧵{k} u
N⧵{k}
l
 is independent on i, we have an equivalent expression:
  ◻
Apparently, a more general analysis of the stability issue seems challenging and 
requires further investigation, while alternative notions (e.g., collective versus uni-
lateral, myopic versus farsighted) of stability are worth exploring.
6  Concluding Remarks
Given this is a new model about externalities that addresses a long-neglected problem, 
in addition to the aforementioned stability issue, naturally it could open up many other 
promising venues for future research: (1) We can explore alternative properties and 
characterizations of the balanced threat agreement. (2) One may adopt a strategic per-
spective to build non-cooperative bargaining protocols to analyze the individual exter-
nality negotiation problems. This will not only help discover the possible underlying 
strategic features of the balanced threat agreement in line with the research agenda of 
the Nash Program (cf. Trockel 2002), but also help motivate other plausible solution 
concepts. (3) We may expect to gain new insights on existing problems if applying the 
current model to concrete settings such as the river sharing problems (cf. van den Brink 
et al. 2018) where individual externalities prevail but are yet to be explicitly studied. (4) 
The current paper is mainly concerned with a speciic negotiation problem with respect 
to a given active group of agents. It is natural and interesting to remove this specii-
cation but study the general negotiation issue with the entire set of agents, which no 
doubt will call for new solution concepts and extended analysis on stability problems. 
2
∑
k∈N u
N
k
n
≥ max
i∈N
�
k∈N⧵{i}
u
N⧵{i}
i
−
∑
k∈N
∑
l∈N⧵{k} u
N⧵{k}
l
n
훽N
i
=
1
n
∑
k∈N
u
N
k
−
1
2
( ∑
k∈N⧵{i}
u
N⧵{i}
k
−
1
n
∑
k∈N
∑
l∈N⧵{k}
u
N⧵{k}
l
)
≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
2
∑
k∈N u
N
k
n
≥
�
k∈N⧵{i}
u
N⧵{i}
k
−
1
n
�
k∈N
�
l∈N⧵{k}
u
N⧵{k}
l
for all i ∈ N.
2
∑
k∈N u
N
k
n
≥ max
i∈N
�
k∈N⧵{i}
u
N⧵{i}
k
−
1
n
�
k∈N
�
l∈N⧵{k}
u
N⧵{k}
l
.
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(5) It may seem ambitious, and therefore quite challenging, but potentially very useful 
if we can introduce coalitional behavior into the modeling of the current problem. This 
would necessarily be a complicated model as it essentially combines the individual 
externality setting with partition function form games, but we may ind it appealing in 
better itting the real world.
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